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Abstract 
While interest in green criminology has rapidly expanded over the past twenty-five years, much of 
this growth has occurred on the periphery of orthodox criminology. This article suggests that green 
criminology’s marginalization is partially a result of its non-quantitative methodology. We 
hypothesize that non-quantitative tendencies within green criminology distance it from orthodox 
criminology because orthodox criminology values quantitative methods. Here, we examine how 
neglecting quantitative research methods may contribute to inattention to green criminology within 
orthodox criminology, and we consider what can be done to change that situation. We suggest that 
employing quantitative approaches within green criminology is one way to increase its appeal to 
mainstream criminology, and that quantitative studies, in conjunction with other research 
methodologies, can also enhance generalizability of findings, influence policy, and advance theory 
construction and hypothesis testing. 
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Introduction 
 While green criminology is now more than twenty-five years in the making (Lynch 1990; see 
also Frank and Lynch 1992), the study of environmental crimes and harms is a neglected research 
area within the field of criminology. By ‘‘neglected,’’ we mean that there is little reference to green 
criminological research within the broader discipline of criminology or within what we shall call 
‘‘orthodox criminology.’’ By ‘‘orthodox criminology,’’ we mean three things. First, the traditional 
subject matter that criminologists research, which generally includes studies of street offending and 
responses thereto. This includes, for example, studies focused on individual offenders, gangs, 
policing, law, correctional systems and punishment, courts, as well as forms of crime (e.g., murder, 
rape, robbery). Second, orthodox criminology is largely comprised of traditional criminological 
theories, which often means excluding a wide range of critically-oriented theories found in 
critical/radical criminology, feminist criminology, critical race perspectives and green criminology. 
Third, from these traditional criminological theories, orthodox criminologists derive testable 
research hypotheses, which they assess empirically using social science research methods, especially 
quantitative research methods. 
 To be sure, green criminologists refer to green criminological scholarship, but there are few 
references to green criminology within orthodox criminology (Lynch et al. 2004; McGurrin et al. 
2013; Zilney et al. 2006). This is perhaps part of a larger trend in orthodox criminology to ignore 
crimes of the powerful [and the fact that the most significant green crimes are committed by the 
powerful (cf. Agnew 2013)], and the rejection of research that challenges formal legal definitions of 
‘‘crime’’ (Lynch and Michalowski 2006; Lynch et al. 2015a; Michalowski 2009; Rothe and Kauzlarich 
2016). For example, Lynch, McGurrin, et al. (2004) examined the representation of a host of white-
collar crimes in leading criminology journals, textbooks, and Ph.D. programs, including studies on 
environmental crimes. Among their findings was that the term ‘‘toxic waste’’ failed to appear even 
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once in any of eight different criminology journals, over a period of 4 years. Lynch, McGurrin, et al. 
(2004) also found that only 3.6% of articles in criminology journals examined white-collar crime (of 
any kind). A recent replication of Lynch et al. (2004) study by McGurrin et al. (2013) found that 
white-collar crime articles construe about 6.3% of all articles published in fifteen criminology 
journals from 2001 to 2010. Zilney et al. (2006) examined studies in environmental justice published 
from 1970 through 2003. The authors found that criminologists published only 2.5% of all 
environmental justice studies, and only 6% of environmental justice articles were published in 
criminology journals (Zilney et al. 2006). 
 While we certainly believe that green criminology can contribute insights to many areas of 
criminological research, the empirical assessments of the criminology literature suggest that this has 
not happened to the extent that it might. In this article, we argue that this has occurred because in 
contrast to orthodox criminological literature, much of the green with using other methodological 
approaches to study criminological questions. Rather, our point is that the neglect of quantitative 
work within green criminology is inconsistent with tendencies within orthodox criminology, and this 
creates a barrier between green and orthodox criminology that is not easily overcome. Green 
criminology’s under-utilization of quantitative research methods—the preferred method within 
orthodox criminology—needs to be addressed because of the importance of the issues involved in 
the study of environmental crime and harm. Green criminology addresses broad forms of ecological 
destruction and environmental injustice, and includes examining a wide range of victims that, in 
addition to humans, include non-human species and the ecosystem itself (see, e.g., South and 
Brisman 2013). For the green criminologist, animal abuse, biodiversity loss, wildlife trafficking, 
climate change, and so on also raise questions about environmental and ecological justice and 
potential legal remedies for these situations (White 2007, 2013)—and are important issues ignored in 
orthodox criminology. While these are crucial topics in the contemporary global context of 
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ecological collapse in other disciplines (Wackernagel and Rees 2004), the relevance of these topics to 
the discussion of crime found in orthodox criminology has been overlooked (Lynch et al. 2004; 
McGurrin et al. 2013; Zilney et al. 2006). Orthodox criminology has been relatively inflexible in its 
unwillingness to explore harms not proscribed by law and has tended to focus almost exclusively on 
interpersonal acts of street crime. There is little doubt that green criminology has developed 
substantially over the past decade. That growing interest, however, seems to be isolated among 
criminologists claiming green criminology as a research interest, and rarely penetrates orthodox 
criminological discourse. We are concerned with this situation because we believe that the insights 
of green criminology not only challenge the orthodox concept of crime, but illustrate the many 
forms of harm and victimization that ecological destruction generates through the crimes of the 
powerful. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear from research in other disciplines that 
ecological destruction is changing the very nature of the world around us, bringing us closer and 
closer to ecological collapse. This significant problem, ignored in orthodox criminology, is a key 
concern within green criminology, and research addressing these issues must be expanded to keep 
criminology relevant in this changing global ecological content (Lynch and Stretesky 2014).  
As mentioned above, it is difficult to penetrate the ideological boundaries of orthodox criminology, 
and numerous criminologists have referred to the class-based nature of this ideological wall which 
draws attention primarily to the crimes of the poor and powerless (Sutherland 1949; Chambliss 
1989, Chambliss 1975; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970). To be sure, green criminology also 
exposes crimes committed by powerful actors and the inefficacy of administrative, civil, criminal and 
regulatory laws (Frank and Lynch 1992; Lynch et al. 2013), highlights issues of environmental justice 
(Brisman 2008; Lynch et al. 2015a), and the wide range of victims of different types produced by 
green crimes (Jarrell et al. 2013; Wyatt 2013). None of these issues receives sufficient attention 
within orthodox criminology. We assert the tendency for green criminological researchers to use 
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non-quantitative methods plays a significant role in the marginalization of green criminology within 
the discipline of criminology. To substantiate this point, we provide a brief overview of the role 
quantitative research plays within criminology.  
Quantitative Analysis and Criminology  
 Historically, the discipline of criminology has been shaped largely by efforts to study crime 
and justice scientifically, along with a strong reliance on theory testing and quantitative analysis—a 
tradition that stretches back to Quetelet (1831). Many disciplines rely upon quantitative studies to 
generate knowledge, and the history of criminology’s efforts to be recognized as a science is 
reflected in its quantitative orientation. To be sure, quantitative studies, when approached correctly, 
provide important information about relevant hypotheses, and are useful for assessing whether a 
theory or hypothesis about a subject or a particular relationship relevant to criminological issues is 
empirically sustainable and worth retaining and developing. It is not our intention here to engage in 
a debate about the limitations of quantitative research approaches or their alternatives within 
criminology (for a discussion, see, e.g., DiChristina 1997, 2000; Worrall 2000), or how using 
different research methods shapes knowledge within a discipline. Rather, we simply wish to draw 
attention to the fact that criminological research is overwhelmingly quantitatively oriented, and when 
that orientation is ignored by any criminological subfield, this can contribute to its marginalization 
within criminology. This problem/concern has been raised and analyzed previously by feminist 
criminologists (Westmarland 2001) and radical criminologists alike (Lynch 1987, 2015).  
 Quantitative research is characteristic of the social sciences more generally. In their study of 
the content of articles published in major sociology journals from 1935 through 2005, Hunter and 
Leahey (2008) found that about two-thirds of the 1274 articles published employed quantitative data 
and methods. Studies of the content of articles published within criminology journals show even 
greater reliance on quantitative methods (Kleck et al. 2006; Tewksbury et al. 2005, 2010). In his 
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study, Buckler (2008) found that across upper and lower tier criminology journals, there was a 
preference for the use of quantitative methods and analysis. Buckler reported that 90.7% of the 948 
studies published in those journals from 2003 through 2007 used quantitative data and analyses. In 
contrast, we estimate that less than 10 percent of green criminological studies—which includes those 
researchers identify as doing ‘‘conservation criminology’’—employ quantitative data and methods. 
That observation is important to the extent that it illustrates a large difference between the content 
of the green criminological and orthodox criminological literatures that, we suggest, impedes the 
integration of green criminological research into the larger criminological literature.  
Orthodox criminologists tend to create research questions that emphasize quantitative approaches. 
This quantitative approach in orthodox criminology exists despite any ‘‘best’’ approach to generate 
knowledge. As a result, the vast bulk of criminological research is quantitative. It is within this 
marketplace of science that quantitative research is valued and non-quantitative research is devalued. 
Thus, non-quantitative work continues to be under-represented in the criminological literature.  
The Relevance of Quantitative Green Research  
 Above, we illustrated that criminological research is overwhelmingly quantitatively oriented. 
Because criminology research on environmental crimes and harms often do not employ quantitative 
methods, we contend that this limits the appearance of green criminological studies in mainstream 
criminological literature—or even the citation to research by green criminologists in orthodox 
criminological books and journal articles.  
 We image that many green criminologists might shrug at this observation, and perhaps do 
not care much that this is the case. In our view, however, this is an issue of vital importance. If green 
criminology has difficulty permeating mainstream criminological literature, there is little hope that 
green criminologists will influence the content of that literature. In our view, that is an important 
limitation of green criminological research. Of what value is green criminological research if its reach 
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within its own discipline is limited? How can unread research impact the issues that serve as its 
subject(s)/topics of study? If green criminology produces only what can be described as an ‘‘in-
bred’’ literature, where lies the benefit of preaching to the choir? Below, we review our concerns as 
they pertain to the following issues: (1) influence and appeal; (2) generalizability; (3) policy; and (4) 
theory and hypothesis testing.  
Influence and Appeal  
 It is difficult to make in-roads into quantitatively oriented literature without research that 
employs quantitative methods. Despite the value and importance of the articles, chapters and books 
that have been written on/in green criminology, refraining from using quantitative methods limits 
the integration of green criminology into the broader field of criminology.  
Unlike other sub-fields within criminology, green criminologists do not take any specific position on 
the use of one methodological approach (e.g., qualitative or quantitative), and do not argue that one 
method is necessarily more appropriate to green criminological research. This is not true for other 
criminological sub-fields. For example, there has been a tendency among radical/critical 
criminologies, for example, to sometimes reject quantitative analysis as part of their challenge to 
orthodox criminology and as part of efforts to distance these alternative criminologies from their 
orthodox origins (see, e.g., Lynch 1987, 2015). As an example, in cultural criminology there has been 
a purposeful critique of quantitative analysis that outwardly rejects its use (Ferrell et al. 2004; Young 
2011). In contrast, in our view, the neglect of quantitative research within green criminology has 
been largely ‘‘accidental’’—it is the result of the ways in which green criminologists have approached 
the examination of environmental crimes, and is not a deliberate attempt to rebuff orthodox 
criminology’s preference for quantitative analysis or scientific methods. In this sense, then, we can 
say that as a field of study, green criminology does not inherently eschew quantitative analysis.  
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 While green criminology’s under-utilization of quantitative research methods seems more a 
matter of preference than prejudice, this reality can create the impression that green criminology 
cannot be explored using quantitative methods. For example, as Higgins (2011, p. 48) writes:  
To date...theories directed at environmental crime...seem to take a macro level of analysis and 
originate from a critical criminological (or conflict) theoretical tone. This creates difficulty in testing 
concepts associated with these kinds of environmental crime theories. Thus, one would have to 
wonder if the theories provide any real advancement in the understanding of environmental crime 
beyond a philosophical debate [emphasis ours]. This is not to say that theories that have been 
empirically tested do not offer a substantial amount of information. For instance, green criminology 
seems to provide a great deal of information on all parts of environmental crime. The central 
components of green criminology, however, seem to be a reformulation of the current macro-level 
theories that have existed in criminology for some time. Furthermore, not all the parts of green 
criminology may be testable, suggesting that some reformulation is necessary.  
 This excerpt illustrates at least two issues of concern. The first is that theories grounded in 
conflict or critical paradigms and which require macro-level measurement (units of analysis) cannot, 
at the same time, generate testable hypotheses. This sentiment can also be found in more general 
criticisms of conflict and radical criminologies. For example:  
• ‘‘Critics still complain that [conflict] theory does not define its major concepts well, which 
poses difficulty for testing’’ (Kubrin et al. 2009, p. 244);  
• ‘‘Marxist theory has been criticized for stating tautological propositions and dogmatic 
ideology rather than providing a testable theory of law making and enforcement’’ (Akers and 
Sellers 2009, p. 240);  
• ‘‘Conflict theory has several analytic issues that make empirical testing of this perspective 
quite difficult. As a result, some believe that the literature is characterized by too many ideas 
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and not enough systematic research and that most empirical studies are illustrative of, but do 
not actually test, the theory (Liska and Messner 1999: 2008). These have been longstanding 
criticisms.’’ (Kubrin et al. 2009, p. 239).  
 What this line of thinking does not explain is how or why concepts from macro-level critical 
theories are any more difficult to test than, for example, abstract psychological concepts generated 
from micro-level theories grounded in classical or positivist paradigms. It appears this sentiment has 
garnered a widespread acceptance within mainstream criminology, however. To be sure, a lack of 
quantitative studies within green criminology can hinder its theoretical development. The 
assumption, however, that concepts discussed by green criminologists cannot be empirically 
tested—rather than an observation that suggests that they tend not to be quantitatively assessed—is 
exactly the type of problem that arises from a paucity of quantitative assessments. More quantitative 
work within green criminology could address this misconception.  
 That the above criticisms of conflict and radical criminologies also appear to use the paucity 
of empirical tests of critical theories examining environmental issues to justify a disregard of such 
theories illustrates a second issue arising from a lack of quantitative work in green criminology. 
Admittedly, theories that lack parsimony need reformulation to lend themselves to empirical 
assessment (Lynch et al. 2013). And we would agree with the importance of empirical studies to 
advance a body of knowledge past philosophical debate. But we dispute the notion that critical 
theories regarding environmental issues cannot move understandings of environmental issues past 
philosophical debate. This suggests that criminologists in general are quite unaware of the large body 
of scientific literature on environmental issues in other disciplines that employ quantitative methods. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the lack of quantitative studies within green criminology is facilitating 
a myth that theories grounded in critical or conflict orientations cannot explain environmental issues 
because they cannot be tested. Here, we will not review the large number of relevant quantitative 
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studies generated by ecological Marxists, such as Andrew K. Jorgenson, whom we estimate has 
produced more than 65 such studies between 2003 and 2016 alone, or the thousands of scientific 
studies that incorporate quantitative analyses of environmental issues. Instead, we maintain that the 
type of arguments highlighted above appear to be used within orthodox criminology to justify a 
distancing from ideas promulgated in green criminology. In this sense, the lack of quantitative 
studies within green criminology seems to (inadvertently) isolate green criminology from orthodox 
criminology. But this is a two-way street: mainstream criminologists contribute to that distancing by 
ignoring the green criminological literature and its uses, and creating a caricature of green 
criminology as untestable.  
 Given the absence of any definitive statements about quantitative methods within the green 
criminological literature, we suggest that the perception that green criminology harbors an anti-
empirical or anti-quantitative orientation is indeed more of a perception than a reality. At the same 
time, however, we believe that the perception of an anti-quantitative stance within green criminology 
is perhaps not unwarranted given the dearth of quantitative green criminological studies, and this has 
important implications for the majority of orthodox criminologists. For example, orthodox 
criminologists have a tendency to overlook green criminology’s relevance and importance to the 
study of crime and justice more generally. This facilitates the orthodox criminologists’ tendency to 
ignore that literature perhaps even when it is quantitatively oriented and relevant to larger 
discussions of crime and justice. In addition, orthodox criminologists are rather unlikely to attempt 
to contribute to the green criminological literature because they perceive an anti-quantitative bias 
among green criminologists. Again, this reduces the likelihood that orthodox criminologists will 
refer to green criminological research and increases the prospects for green criminological research 
to remain un-integrated or outright ignored. Equally important, orthodox criminologists are unlikely 
to attempt to undertake quantitative studies related to green criminological issues because they might 
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well believe that the audience for such studies is not only limited, but ideologically pre-disposed to 
reject that type of research. As noted above, criminology journals either demonstrate a preference 
for publishing studies using quantitative methodologies or criminologists tend to prefer those 
methods more generally (Buckler 2008; Kleck et al. 2006; Tewksbury et al. 2005, 2010).  
 To be sure, while descriptive articles are useful strategies for understanding crime, law and 
justice, an over-reliance on those approaches to any subject—not just environmental crime and 
harm—generates a loosely connected ‘‘descriptive’’ literature. This is a problem that perhaps 
characterizes the present state of green criminological literature. As we explain below, this loosely-
connected literature remains as such because the refusal to adopt quantitative analysis can hamper 
efforts to develop and test hypotheses and theories that provide a framework to which individual 
researchers may link their studies and arguments. Indeed, the development of hypotheses and 
theories are often the glue of a discipline or sub-discipline—and, as Bhaskar (1998) argues, those 
hypotheses and theories act as useful scripts for interpretive purposes, helping to form the basis of 
scientific enterprises. In this view, quantitative analysis plays a role in developing a field of research 
in theoretical ways as well.  
 In the sections that follow, we review a few important issues of concern that tend to be 
perceived as problematic from the perspective of orthodox criminologists. These concerns are 
attached to how orthodox criminologists interpret the utility of research. The material that follows 
does not suggest that any specific green criminological study ignores these concerns, but that green 
criminologists must be aware that these are the kinds of issues that an orthodox criminologists 
expects that a study should address. In reviewing these issues, we focus attention on how, in its 
current state, green criminology might overlook addressing key concerns that influence how 
orthodox criminologists perceive studies where these issues are not addressed.  
Generalizability  
	1
3 
 In considering the relevance of quantitative research, green criminologists must also address 
issues related to the generalizability of qualitative research especially from case studies (Schofield 
2002). Case studies, for example, are not chosen on the basis of random sampling (i.e., they contain 
selection bias), but are specifically selected to illustrate a particular type of problem—or the 
emergence of a particular problem in a particular place—thereby limiting their broader applicability 
and utility (see, Schofield 2002, for discussion). Moreover, generalizability from case studies is 
limited by case availability or sample size (Schofield 2002). In a case study—regardless of how much 
other information is used, such as the number of interviewers within the case study—the N for the 
study is 1. That is, the N is 1 because the case study is a study of one event or process. Moreover, if 
the case study is about, for example, perceptions of environmental crime A in a specific location X, 
and it has used 1000 interviews as the qualitative data for assessment, and the interviews were 
selected based on random sampling, the outcome of the analysis is only generalizable to the rest of 
the population in location X, and not to people/population in other places.  
 Because the N in such approaches is 1, there is no assurance that any of the information 
gleaned from a case study can be generalized to any other case (e.g., another location), and unless the 
same issue has been examined in other places, and a connection across places can be established 
from extant literature, the extent to which the results of the case study can be generalized is an 
unknown. (Thus, for example, one cannot generalize a case study of interview of illegal wildlife 
traffickers in Laos to other countries even if one conducted 5000 interviews. The case study is still 
about Laos and not about anywhere else. The information gathered, therefore, is not generalizable.)  
In contrast, quantitative studies can include dozens, hundreds or thousands of cases (and perhaps 
more) across time and place, and because of that can be generalized to other locations when the 
sampling procedure is adequate. To generalize from case studies, the same observations must be 
made repeatedly in other places, and common characteristics from those studies must latter be 
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extracted empirically to produce generalizable knowledge. Understood in this light, the preference 
for case study approaches adds an additional layer of research that must be repeated hundreds of 
times before empirical methods can be applied to case study data to generate generalizable 
knowledge. Appropriate empirical methods, in other words, not only produce generalizable results 
when proper research methods frame the study, but provide a useful shortcut for the production of 
generalizable knowledge. In the long run, case study research should produce the same kind of 
generalizable knowledge that empirically based research produces, but when case studies are relied 
upon to do so, this is a rather slow process (Schofield 2002).  
Policy  
 Generalizable research outcomes can be used to shape and influence policy. Case studies, 
when not generalizable, have restrictive policy implications, unless they employ pre-post- evaluation 
methods—a criterion that is difficult to meet when using case study approaches (Ritchie and 
Spencer 2002). Historically, orthodox criminology has long used policy relevant quantitative 
methods, and again, prefers that approach. While qualitative case study approaches can offer some 
general but often subjective observations about the effect of an enacted policy, it is not able to make 
those claims with any kind of surety—that is, with respect to estimating statistical outcome 
probabilities. These kinds of statistical measures (i.e., probability) are important in policy terms 
because they indicate the likelihood that a policy will have the desired effect. In short, the neglect of 
empirical quantitative analysis limits the policy applications of green criminology, reducing its 
potential influence on ecological policies useful for controlling the deleterious ecological impacts 
caused by humans. Indeed, one could argue that logically, no one should make policy based on one 
or a few qualitative case studies because it is unknown whether those case studies represent the 
universe of cases. It should be noted that this criticism could also be true of quantitative case studies 
that lack appropriate research design and controls.  
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Theory and Hypothesis Testing  
 Empirical research plays an important role in theory development and hypothesis testing. 
Hypothesis testing is an important dimension of establishing whether an explanation of an 
outcome/event is useful and should be employed as the basis for course, is not to imply that all 
quantitative knowledge is useful simply because it is generated empirically. What this does mean, 
however, is that empirical knowledge can help us decide which theories are useful, providing that the 
quantitative assessments and their interpretations are adequate.  
 Any explanation that attempts to describe a phenomenon is ‘‘useful’’ in three ways (Bhaskar 
1998). First, the explanation must be logically valid and sufficiently well designed to exclude 
alternative explanations. This type of assessment may be made both with reference to empirical data 
and logical analysis. Second, it can be applied to other cases—that is to cases other than the one 
from which the explanation was derived. To meet this condition, the evidence from an analysis must 
be generalizable. Third, an explanation is useful to the extent that its repeated application to a 
number of other cases produces similar results. If the above conditions hold, then we can say that 
the explanation acquires the status of a theory and applies to all or to a significant majority of cases 
and to new emerging cases as well. Here, we take the view that a theory is not simply any form of 
explanation of an event/outcome, but is a description of a relationship that generates hypotheses 
about a phenomena or event, and that the hypothesis can be tested and generalized, indicating that 
the explanation can be generalized and then recognized as a theory—assuming that the majority of 
its tenants cannot be rejected (for a more capacious conception of theory, see, e.g., Brisman 2014).  
 Within the green criminological literature itself, one can also see how the under-utilization of 
quantitative methods impacts the theoretical development of green criminology. It has been widely 
noted and accepted in the literature that green criminology does not possess or offer its own theory 
or theories upon which it bases its analyses (Brisman 2014). While Brisman’s description is accurate, 
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there is a need to understand how that situation is affected by the link between theory development 
and quantitative research strategies. As Brisman acknowledges, some existing criminological theories 
developed to explain crimes other than ecological harms have been employed to understand the 
emergence of environmental/ecological justice. For example, in various studies, Clarke and his 
associates have tested Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, Disposable 
(CRAVED) models (Clarke and Rolf 2013; Lemieux and Clarke 2009; Petrossian and Clarke 2014; 
Pires and Clarke 2011, 2012). In addition, Stretesky, Lynch and Long have tested various political 
economic, treadmill of production and environmental justice theories that have arisen in other fields’ 
study of environmental harms (Long et al. 2012; Lynch and Stretesky 2013; Lynch et al. 2004a, b; 
Stretesky 2003, 2006; Stretesky and Hogan 1998; Stretesky et al. 2011, 2013; Stretesky and Lynch 
1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2009a, b, 2011a, b). These quantitative studies indicate that each of these 
theoretical explanations has important applications in the study of green criminological issues and 
that each has substantial support. In this case, these empirical studies indicate that tested hypotheses 
can be generalized, and hence can be employed to generate theoretical explanations of green crime 
and justice. As noted earlier, however, green criminology’s neglect of quantitative methods limits 
generalizable knowledge suitable for theory construction or the specification of testable hypotheses. 
Thus, there is a tendency for existing ‘‘explanations’’ of green crime derived from works that may or 
may not prove, in the long run, to be generalizable. 
Objective Versus Subjective Explanation  
 In the previous section, we noted that quantitative data can, under specific conditions, 
produce testable hypotheses, and that likewise, under appropriate methodological conditions, those 
hypotheses can be tested and potentially used for theory construction (Eisenhardt 2002). This 
approach constitutes a ‘‘normal’’ scientific model in which observations generate hypotheses that are 
tested and then used to assess whether the observations are appropriate and potentially generalizable 
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into a relevant theoretical explanation that apply across a mass of cases. The goal of this commonly-
accepted scientific approach is to produce valid and reliable observations that can be used to explain 
and predict outcomes in an efficient manner so that they can be understood and controlled. 
Scientifically, we can think of this approach as producing objective explanations that contribute to a 
base of knowledge because the extracted knowledge can be tested repeatedly in the same way, 
thereby producing the same outcome. 
 Part of the dynamic of this scientific approach relies on its ability to produce numerous tests 
of a hypothesis to and assess the likelihood that the aggregation of these tests is efficient and similar 
in their predictive content. For this to occur, the assessment must be ‘‘objective,’’ meaning that it 
employs agreed upon procedures that are repeatable, regardless of who performs the assessment. 
Moreover, the end result of these tests is an aggregation of the results into generalizable 
observations produced by numerous observations of relevant data. When these procedures are 
followed, there is reason to believe (a high probability) that the outcome is objective and is not a 
consequence of the way in which the data is collected, assessed and interpreted—in other words, 
that it is not simply a methodological artifact of the analytic procedure. The orthodox criminologist 
is concerned that these kinds of outcomes may not be achieved simply through the use of one 
methodological approach, or, absence of any methodological approach.  
 Quantitative data, by its nature, is designed to help facilitate objective assessment out- 
comes. To be sure, quantitative data can be manipulated, and performed inadequately, or 
inappropriately interpreted, subverting the effort to produce an objective outcome, and, we would 
suggest, that this is a problem found in many tests of criminological theories that explain crime. 
With respect to attempting to produce objective outcomes, orthodox criminologists prefer 
quantitative data over qualitative data, which unfortunately generates suspicion of qualitative 
research especially when qualitative researchers do not appropriately provide information assuring 
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that the methods employed produce useable outcomes. For example, we have noted that the case 
study is often limited to one case, meaning that it does not meet the minimum requirements for 
extracting objective, generalizable knowledge that meet with the expectations of mathematical 
probability modeling. This has important consequences for green criminologists who undertake 
qualitative studies because they need to assure their audience that the assessment does not reflect 
subjective assessment criteria, and must ensure that assessment criteria have been openly delineated 
(Schofield 2002). In the criminological literature, this point has been addressed, for example, with 
respect to the development of explanations of state-corporate crime derived from qualitative 
assessments (Lynch et al. 2013). In this case, it has been argued that each new qualitative assessment 
may uncover some new factor(s) that appear relevant to explaining state crime. Following such a 
method, however, produces a rapidly expanding ‘‘theory’’ of state-corporate crime that employs 
invalid inclusionary criteria, resulting in non-parsimonious explanations in which every variable that 
has been proposed becomes part of a rather unwieldy theoretical model that cannot be adequately 
assessed (Lynch et al. 2013). Such an approach yields too many variables beyond those necessary for 
an adequate explanation (Lynch et al. 2013).  
 In constructing such unwieldy models, interpretations of which variable should be included 
or which variables ‘‘count more’’ than others is an important concern. Absent some pre-specified 
conditions, the choice of what to include and exclude is left to the researcher’s preferences (Lynch et 
al. 2013). Under these conditions, it is highly likely that different researchers can produce 
dramatically different explanations of the outcome when faced with the same qualitative data. The 
same is not true for quantitative analysis as the test conditions are pre-specified and the same across 
studies. That is to say, a regression analysis of data set A produces result X each time the model is 
run when the models and data are the same. The same is not necessarily true for qualitative data 
analysis, and indeed, in recognition of this possibility, a good qualitative study should have several 
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coders/interpreters so that outcome reliability can be assessed (Maxwell 2002; Schofield 2002). 
Currently, qualitative data assessments found in the green criminological literature have not often 
used intercoder reliability to determine if multiple individuals extract the same 
outcome/conclusions/facts from qualitative data. Because such procedures have not been 
employed, this leaves open the possibility that existing qualitative green criminological studies reflect 
subjective interpretation biases. This is an issue green criminologists should address before they can 
expect the results of qualitative studies to be more widely accepted as relevant, generalizable, 
objective observations by a broader criminological audience. In this case, the burden is on green 
criminologists to employ more valid qualitative research assessment methods. This is an important 
issue green criminologists should not continue to overlook. 
The Role of Critique 
 One of the current problems faced by green criminology is that it has largely developed in an 
intellectual vacuum. By ‘‘intellectual vacuum,’’ we mean that green criminology has developed in an 
insulated state, largely free from external criticism, especially from orthodox criminologists. This is 
not surprising because green criminology has not entered the orthodox criminological literature to 
the extent necessary to stimulate such a critique. Indeed, with the exceptions of Halsey’s (2004), 
Davies’ (2014) and Jewkes and Moran’s (2015) articles, there have been limited efforts to critique 
green criminology—a phenomenon likely attributable to the limited contact most criminologists 
have with the green criminological literature. This has something to do with the lack of quantitative 
studies in this area and the orthodox criminological assumption is that this lack of quantitative study 
means green criminology has little to offer to the field in terms of understanding crime, law or 
justice, and hence, there is little to criticize. Most certainly, that assumption is both unstated and 
unfair because, as we have noted earlier, green criminology has much to offer on a number of issues 
explored within criminology. Indeed, orthodox criminologists would find much to critique in the 
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green criminological literature if they read it, especially with respect to the definition of ‘‘crime’’ and 
the range of victims and victimization (see, e.g., Lynch et al. 2015a). Here, we bring up the issue of 
critique as one of the potential roles filled by quantitative assessments. When, for example, an 
explanation or set of hypotheses about some relationship is suggested, an essential form of critique 
can be posed by a quantitative assessment of those hypotheses. To be sure, quantitative assessment 
may not always result in critique if, for instance, the hypotheses are not rejected. Absent quantitative 
analysis, however, it is difficult to assess the utility of any given hypothesis or observation. Without 
some sort of valid assessment of hypotheses, all that can be asserted is a belief that the hypotheses 
are true and relevant, which is hardly the state of explanation that green criminologists should be 
striving to create.  
Conclusion  
 At this moment in the historical development of green criminology, it is necessary to 
consider and address the importance of quantitative studies with respect to broadening the appeal 
and scope of green criminology. Quantitative studies can add layers of information to what is known 
and produce information that is otherwise missing when those studies are neglected. That is to say, a 
mature and well-developed green criminology requires the development of an empirical literature 
enriched by a host of research methodologies- including quantitative methods. To be sure, 
criminology has a long history of emphasizing quantitative analysis, and the failure of green 
criminology to address similar issues in empirically relevant ways creates a barrier between green 
criminology and orthodox criminology that is difficult to overcome. It is not only the orthodox 
criminologists that create this barrier to green criminology, but the green criminologists who also 
create this impediment to the inclusion of green criminology in more diverse ways within the field of 
criminology.  
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 Things, of course, do not need to be this way. There is in the world around us an 
extraordinary wealth of empirical data that can be employed to address theoretically relevant 
questions that can lead to both the enhancement of the green criminological literature and its 
recognition by orthodox criminologists (e.g., Burns and Lynch 2004). The green criminologist, 
however, cannot sit idly by in the hopes that orthodox criminologists will see the wisdom of the 
insights generated by green criminologists, and will subsequently begin to develop an empirically 
oriented green criminological literature. The impetus for such a movement must, in contrast, come 
from within green criminology. To be sure, there is no guarantee that an effort to generate a 
quantitative green criminological literature will necessarily enhance the integration of green 
criminology into the orthodox criminological literature. Indeed, this approach has been suggested in 
radical criminology (Lynch 1988) with little effect, despite the strength of empirical findings related 
to radical criminological theories and hypotheses (Lynch et al. 2006). Then again, one can say that 
radical but especially critical criminology never developed much of a quantitative literature. Whether 
or not expanded use of quantitative methods increases the acceptance of green criminology, such 
studies will enhance the strength of green criminology and insulate it from criticism that its 
assumptions cannot be quantified or tested empirically. 
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